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SPIN-OFFS IN THE LODGING INDUSTRY 
Linda Canina 
and 
Teri Klein 
ABSTRACT - 
Many lodging companies now find themselves in a challenging position. They 
are finding it more difficult to attract capital as the industry's growth begins to stabi- 
lize due to the inherent cycles and the onset of supply growth. Companies seeking 
growth and access to public financing must confront questions regarding the best 
structure as the marketplace changes. Many hotel companies are hybrid enter- 
prises, functioning as operating companies and heavy investors in real estate. The 
two sides of the business have different risk and potential growth profiles. Special- 
. 
ization achieved through spin-offs may lead to higher growth, better access to capi- 
tal markets, and improvements in shareholder value. Other research has found a 
positive stock price reaction to the announcement of spin-offs for the overall mar- 
ket. This paper analyzes whether the financial market perceives spin-offs in the 
lodging industry as creating additional value. These results will assist lodging 
managers as they make decisions concerning the structure of the firm in an attempt 
to maximize value. 
Introduction 
Many lodging companies now find themselves in a challenging position as the in- 
dustry's growth begins to stabilize due to the inherent cycles and the onset of supply 
growth. Public lodging companies are finding it more difficult to support earnings- 
per-share increases at the rates required to continue to attract investors. Companies seek- 
ing growth and access to public financing must confront questions regarding the best 
structure as the marketplace changes. The idea of managing for shareholder value is ex- 
tremely important in the lodging industry as long as managers continue to look toward 
Wall Street for financing. 
Growth is critical to extending the future horizon for lodging companies in the capi- 
tal markets. Many hotel companies are hybrid enterprises, functioningas operating com- 
panies and heavy investors in real estate. The two sides of the business have different risk 
and potential growth profiles. Perhaps this hybrid structure is suitable for diverseng 
owner risk. However, it is not beneficial for investors who hold diversified portfolios. As 
a result, specialization achieved through restructuring may lead to higher growth, better 
access to capital markets, and improvements in shareholder value. Since the trend in the 
lodging industry has been toward specialization and consolidation, this paper analyzes 
whether specialization in the lodging industry is perceived by the financial market to 
create additional value. 
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In 1992, when Mamott Corporation announced its plan to split into two publicly 
held companies, the idea was described as radical and controversia1.l However, the cor- 
porate spin-off2 as a form of corporate restructuring is not new to U.S. industry. In fact, 
the first spin-off was undertaken in 1911 by Standard OiL3 Since the beginning of the 
1990s this type of divestiture has become better recognized and utilized by the hospital- 
ity industry to enhance the value of shareholder investments. From 1992 to 1995 there 
were five announcements of spin-offs in the lodging industry alone. 
Spin-offs are a form of corporate restructuring in which the parent firm becomes 
smaller. A spin-off creates a separate new legal entity; its shares are distributed on a pro 
rata basis to existing shareholders of the parent company. Thus, existing shareholders 
have the same proportion of ownership in the new entity as in the original firm. There is, 
however, a separation of control, and over time, the new entity as a separate decision- 
making unit may develop policies and strategies different from those of the original firm. 
Note that no cash is received by the original parent. The original holdings simply are di- 
vided into two or more parts. 
Spin-offs are the mirror image of mergers and yet the two are alleged to increase ag- 
gregate market value. In the case of mergers, synergies may be one possible factor behind 
the increase in value. It is less obvious with spin-offs why the aggregate market value of 
the shares of the two units trading separately should exceed the market value as a single 
unit. Even though a spin-off does not alter the composition of assets supporting the 
shareholders' claims, a spin-off does alter contracts among stockholders, creditors, man- 
agers, and regulators. Therefore, the changes in existing and future contracts are poten- 
tial sources of gain attributed to the spin-off. In certain cases the expected gains from two 
separate, specialized sets of contracts, each tailored to the specific units, exceed the ex- 
pected costs of the spin-off and provide the impetus for the divestiture. Just as mergers 
might provide for economies of scale in contracting among similar operations, spin-offs 
might eliminate diseconomies of scale among dissimilar operating units. 
As the giants of the lodging industry such as Marriott, Promus, ITT, and Hilton have 
expanded to include businesses as varied as gaming, real estate ownership, lodging 
operations, and management services, the conclusion has been reached that expansive 
diversification not only detracts from managerial focus, but also clouds information that 
is conveyed to investors and may ultimately act to decrease shareholder value. The re- 
duction of the size and diversity of the asset base under a given management may im- 
prove managers' productivity and increase their efforts to direct resources effectively. 
The Washington Post, "The Unseen Hand Behind Marriott's Split-Up Plan," p. F1, Oct. 12, 
1992. 
Defined as the distribution of all or substantially all of ownership interest of one firm (the 
parent) in another finn (the subsidiary) to the parent's shareholders so that following the spin-off 
there are two publicly held companies. 
3 Kudla, Ronald and Thomas McInish. Corporate Spin-offs, Quorum Books, Westport, Con- 
necticut, p. 101,1984. 
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The separation of lines of business by a spin-off may improve the efficiency of total asset 
management. 
This paper investigates the effects of corporate spin-off announcements on share- 
holder wealth in the lodging industry. We find that spin-offs in the lodging industry have 
created additional wealth for shareholders. A s i w c a n t  positive average share price 
reaction is documented for seven voluntary spin-off announcements between 1964 and 
1995 in the lodging industry. The creation of value from these spin-offs may be the result 
of spin-off -induced organizational changes and/or corporate control activity. Organiza- 
tional changes associated with spin-offs may induce superior parent and spin-off operat- 
ing performance as a result of a reduction in agency and overhead costs, a sharpened fo- 
cus, market allocation as opposed to administrative capital allocation, and/or incentives 
created by more effective compensation of management. In addition, these spin-offs may 
have created value by facilitating the transfer of the assets of either the parent or the sub- 
sidiary to more highly valued uses. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe various 
forms of corporate restructuring, such as sell-offs and spin-offs. In Section 3, we present 
the underlying reasons for spin-offs. In Section 4, we desaibe our sample, methodology, 
and results, respectively. We conclude with a brief summary. 
Corporate Restructuring 
Corporate restructuring can take several different forms: divestitures, equity carve- 
outs, spin-offs, split-offs, and split-ups. A divestiture is a sale of a portion of the firm to 
an outside party. The selling firm is usually paid in cash, marketable securities, or a com- 
bination of the two. An equity carve-out is a variation of a divestiture that involves the 
sale of an equity interest in a subsidiary to outsiders. The sale may not necessarily leave 
the parent company in control of the subsidiary. The new equity gives the investors 
shares of ownership in the portion of the selling company that is being divested. In an 
equity carve-out, a new legal entity is created with a stockholder base that may be differ- 
ent from that of the parent selling company. The divested company has a different man- 
agement team and is run as a separate firm. 
A new legal entity is also created in a spin-off. As with an equity carve-out, new 
shares are issued, but they are distributed to stockholders on a pro rata basis. As a result 
of the proportional distribution of shares, the stockholder base in the new company is the 
same as that of the old company. Although the stockholders are the same, the spun-off 
firm has its own management and is run as a separate company. Another difference is 
that a spin-off normally does not provide the parent with a cash infusion, whereas a di- 
vestiture involves an infusion of funds into the parent corporation. 
In a split-off, some of the stockholders in the parent company are given shares in a 
division of the parent company, which is split off in exchange for their shares in the par- 
ent company. Lastly in a split-up, the entire firm is broken up into a series of spin-offs. 
The end result of a split-up is that the parent company no longer exists; only the newly 
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formed companies remain. The stockholders in the companies may be different, since 
stockholders exchange their shares in the parent company for shares in one or more of the 
units that are spun off. 
Why Spin Off? 
If there are no synergies between the parent and the spun-off subsidiary, the sum of 
the post-divestiture cash flows equals what would have been the combined cash flows of 
the parent and the subsidiary had the two remained as one. In the absence of synergy and 
in a frictionless capital market, the spin-off would not be expected to affect valuation. 
However, in .reality, valuation is affected by a spin-off due to the associated costs and 
benefits. The spin-off requires registration of the new share certificates, distribution of 
the new shares, and duplication of the servicing costs associated with dividend pay- 
ments, ownership transfers, listing on a organized exchange, and so on. As the spun-off 
firms expand, they lose the advantage of economies of scale in raising external capital. 
Further, if there is any positive synergy to joint operation, it will be lost in the spin-off. 
The benefits of independent operations must exceed these costs if stockholders' interests 
are to be sewed through a spin-off. 
A spin-off is not the only way to separate the operations of the two units. Another 
way of achieving independence would be to create an autonomous subsidiary, with the 
parent supplying the capital and the subsidiary passing its income from operations to the 
parent. This would eliminate any diseconomies of scale or operational inefficiencies 
without incurring the duplication of the servicing costs mentioned previously. If a spin- 
off is a more costly transaction than the creation of an autonomous subsidiary, then bene- 
fits must be identified that cannot be achieved with the independent sub-unit, in order to 
rationalize a spin-off. 
It has been suggested that gains arise from the effect on the set of contracts, both ex- 
isting and future, constituting the firm. The redeployment of assets and change of control 
associated with a spin-off affect the existing contracts, especially the senior securities 
such as bonds and preferred stock. Divestitures are motivated by a variety of factors. The 
need for a spin-off may arise because a division of the company is performing poorly or 
simply because it no longer fits into the finds plans. Restructuring may also be necessary 
to undo a previous merger or acquisition that proved unsuccessful. For some companies, 
divestitures are among the few alternatives available to help pay down debt. In most 
cases, divestitures occur for one or more of the following reasons. 
Poor Fit of Division 
Companies sometimes refer to a business as being a "poor fit." By spinning it off, the 
management of the parent company can concentrate on its main activity. If each business 
must stand on its own feet, there is no risk that funds will be siphoned off from one in 
order to support unprofitable investments in the other. Moreover, if the two parts of the 
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business are independent, it is easy to see the value of each and to reward managers 
accordingly. 
A divestiture may create value by slicing off a business that was a poor fit with the 
remaining operations. If so, good divestiture programs may increase the market values of 
both comp&es. In addition, there may be improvements in managerial accountability 
and a strengthening of incentives may be achieved by separating unrelated business ac- 
tivities. Asa  result of these improvements, divestitures may provide managers with 
greater decision-making authority. Better performance evaluation may also be achieved. 
For example, the parent company may want to move out of a particular line of business 
that it feels no longer fits into its plans or in which it is unable to operate profitably. This 
does not mean that another firm, with greater expertise in this line of business, could not 
profitably manage the division's assets. Divestitures then become part of an efficient mar- 
ket process that reallocates assets to those who will allow them to reach the greatest gain. 
Poor Performance 
Companies may want to divest divisions simply because they are not sufficiently 
profitable. The division could fail to pay a rate of return that exceeds the parent compa- 
ny's hurdle rate-the minimum return threshold that a company will use to evaluate 
projects or the performance of parts of the overall company. 
Capital Market Factors 
A divestiture may also take place because the parent firm, as well as the divested 
division, has greater access to capital markets. The combined corporate structure may be 
more difficult for investors to categorize. Divestitures might provide greater access to 
capital markets for the two firms as separate companies than as a combined corporation. 
Many companies spin off segments because they feel that investors do not properly 
value the parent firm due to the diverse types of operations it encompasses. In many 
situations, the parent firm and the spin-off firm have operated in very different lines of 
business and different market atmospheres. Each division has distinct operating, finan- 
cial, and investment characteristics (reflected in the volatility of their earnings), resulting 
in the two entities having different levels of risk. The spinning off of subsidiaries allows 
the resulting companies to attract capital on a basis consistent with their unique market- 
places. The abilities of the parent firm and the spin-off firm to raise capital become 
directly related to the relevant capital markets affecting their respective businesses. 
Firms are also able to issue debt for future expansion through terms that are more in line 
with their unique historical and projected giowth rates. under these circumstances, the 
spin-off serves to insulate each of the businesses from the risks associated with the other. 
Costs of capital and debt are realigned according to the respective risks of the individual 
companies. 
A potential disadvantage to a spin-off in this case, however, is that financing may 
actually be more difficult to obtain after a separation because each company is no longer 
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able to rely on the earnings, cash flows, and assets of the other. The bond ratings for the 
more risky firm could be lowered. 
Intensified Management Leadership and Focus 
The spinning-off of a corporate division or subsidiary creates separate, publicly 
traded companies which have their own dedicated, specialized management staff and 
board of directors. Management teams no longer have to divide their focus, expertise, 
and business resources between the different operations that exist under one corporate 
umbrella. Decisions can be based upon the specific frameworks within which the newly 
segregated businesses operate. In addition, because the operational and financial prog- 
ress of each business is more visible to stockholders, the separation provides a stimulus 
to executives to show growth and improvement. A clearer basis for evaluation of perfor- 
mance is provided for the public and to the investment community. 
T i e s  
Tax benefits can be obtained through spin-offs in at least three ways. If the principal 
asset of a company is real estate, it may be able to qualify as a real estate investment trust 
(REIT). Unlike other corporations whose dividends are payable only after payment of 
corporate income taxes, corporations that qualify as REI'Is may deduct dividends paid to 
shareholders from income before calculating their taxes. 
In addition, a firm may transfer income-producing properties to a trust and distrib- 
ute interest in the trust to its stockholders, thereby avoiding payment of corporate in- 
come taxes on the income from the property. Lastly, if a United States-based company 
derives significant revenues from overseas, it may be advisable to incorporate its foreign 
operations outside the United States and then spin off the resulting firm. The revenues of 
the spin-off firm would then be taxed at the tax rates that prevail in the country of incor- 
poration, which may be lower than in the United States. 
Marketing Considerations 
Corporations may enact spin-offs due to marketing considerations. Some spin-offs 
have been designed to allay fears of customers, suppliers, and others that the parent 
firms were not committed to, and might end participation in, particular industries. Spin- 
offs may also be implemented to separate potentially incompatible product lines. 
Regulatory and Legal Issues 
Regulatory and legal factors have also been the cause of both voluntary and involun- 
tary spin-offs. Spin-offs can be planned to separate regulated and unregulated businesses 
or designed to circumvent legal obstacles that prevent a firm from accomplishing its 
objectives. 
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Spin-08s in the Lodging Industry 
The most common reason for creating spin-offs is that they improve efficiency. This is 
consistent with the explanations given by lodging managers. Management focus and 
capital market factors are the most frequently cited explanations given by lodging man- 
agers for spin-offs. An example of capital market misevaluation motivating a firm to di- 
vide operations is the Promus Corporation's decision to spin off its gaming division un- 
der the name Harrah's Entertainment. The company's decision to spin off was due 
largely to the fact that the company's stock price did not accurately reflect the value of the 
company's hotel division because the casino business, perceived as very risky, overshad- 
owed other operations. When ITI' announced its plan to spin off its businesses to create 
three separate, publicly owned corporations in July 1995, the CEO said the decision was 
made for two fundamental reasons: specialization and access to capital markets. It was 
expected that the new structure would allow the management of the companies to focus 
more intensively on their respective businesses and provide the flexibility for each com- 
pany to grow in a manner best suited for its industry with an expected increase in the 
availability and decrease in the cost of raising capital. In addition, they claimed that the 
separation would enable the management of each of these businesses to organize their 
capital structure and design corporate policies and strategies that would be based pri- 
marily on the business characteristics of the company and to concentrate its financial re- 
sources wholly on its own operations. 
Data, Methodology, and Empirical Results 
Data 
We examine the effects of pure spin-off announcements on shareholder wealth by 
studying a sample of six lodging companies that announced seven spin-offs over the 
1964-1995 period. These companies were identified using the stock distributions coded 
as spin-offs (3763) on the CRSP Daily Master File of the American Stock Exchange, the 
New York Stock Exchange, and NASDAQ firms and from the Wall Street Journal Index. 
We excluded all cases in which the announcement date or stock prices could not be found 
in the WalI Street Journal Index, The Wall Street Journal, the Nexus database, the Bloom- 
berg database, or the CRSP tapes. We define a pure spin-off as a tax-free, pro rata dis- 
tribution of shares of a wholly owned subsidiary to shareholders. All distributions of 
other firms' stock are considered by U.S. tax authorities to be dividends. Fully taxable 
spin-offs, which represent the most frequent type of distribution, tend to involve either a 
parent firm retaining a large percentage of the common shares of a spin-off subsidiary or 
a firm distributing to its own shareholders a large block of shares of another publicly 
traded firm. For a distribution to be tax-exempt under the criteria set forth in Internal 
Revenue Code Section 355, it must represent at least 80% of the outstanding shares of the 
subsidiary, and any shares retained by the parent must not constitute "practical control" 
of the subsidiary. As such nontaxable spin-offs represent restructuring in which a parent 
firm effectively removes itself from the management and ownership of the subsidiary. 
The Journal of Hospitality Financial Management 
Table 1: 
Yearly Distribution of Spin-offs in the Lodging Industry, 1964-1995 
b J 
Year 
1964 
1989 
1992 
1995 
1995 
1995 
1995 
Comvanv - 
Hilton Inc. 
Holiday Corp. 
Mamott Corp. 
Promus Companies 
Hilton Hotel 
I n  Corp. 
Host Marriott 
Announcement Date 
October 16,1964 
August 24,1989 
October 5,1992 
January 30,1995 
May 11,1995 
June 13,1995 
August 9,1995 
Date Spin-Off 
Occurred 
December 2,1964 
February 8,1990 
October 8,1993 
June 30,1995 
Spin-off canceled 
December 15,1995 
December 29,1995 
These pure spin-offs represent the restruturing studied here.4 Table 1 presents the yearly 
distribution of the seven spin-off announcements. 
Daily closing prices of the stock for each company were obtained from the CRSP 
Daily File. The sample period, for each company is defined as 102 days before the an- 
nouncement date through one day after the announcement date. The daily returns were 
computed as the log price relatives adjusted for dividends. 
Methodology 
The effect of voluntary spin-offs on shareholder wealth is examined by testing the 
statistical significance of the unexpected return of the stock during the event period for 
the portfolio of announced spin-offs in the hospitality industry using the event study 
meth~dology.~ The mean model is used to estimate the expected return during the es- 
timation period. The event period is defined as one day before through one day after the 
announcement date. The estimation period consists of 100 trading days prior to the event 
- period. 
To be nontaxable, a spin-off must be motivated by business considerations, not tax avoid- 
ance. Furthermore, Section 355 of the Tax Code requires that parent and subsidiary be actively 
engaged in business for at least five years before the spin-off, that the parent own at least 80 per- 
cent of the subsidiary's stock, that the parent distribute all of its subsidiary securities, and that no 
prearranged plan exists for shareholders to sell the subsidiary stock subsequent to the distribu- 
tion. Failure to satisfy these conditions implies tax treatment of spin-off shares as dividend in- 
come to the parent firm shareholders. 
See Brown and Warner [1980,1985] for a detailed explanation of event study methodology. 
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1) Calculate the t-statistic for the unexpected return, by event day t, by announce- 
ment I: 
and, 2) Calculate the t-statistic for the unexpected return on the portfolio of announced 
spin-offs, by event day t: 
where se is the standard error of the unexpected returns calculated over the 100-day 
estimation period prior to the event period of each announcement. 
Resu 1 ts 
The unexpected return for each day in the event period, by announcement, and the 
unexpected return for each day in the event period for the portfolio of spin-offs are 
shown in Table 2. Notice that for all but one of the announcements, there is a positive 
price response from the market on the announcement date and/or the previous date. The 
exception is Hilton, where there is a significantly negative stock price response on the 
announcement date. However, this announcement is unique because there were two an- 
nouncements from Hilton on that date. In addition to the spin-off, there was news that 
the company was unable to find a buyer for their hotel and gambling operations. The 
market believed that Hilton's decision to spin off its casinos to shareholders was the re- 
sult of their failure to find a buyer. 
The average unexpected returns for the portfolio of spin-offs for the day preceding 
(day - 1) and the day of the announcement (day 0) are 3.09% and 2.16%, respectively. 
S i e c a n c e  tests of the unexpected returns are also given in Table 2. The average excess 
returns on days - 1 and 0 have t-statistics of 4.3 and 2.2, respectively, which indicate sta- 
tistically significant (at the 0.01 level) share price reactions on each of the two days. On 
average, the market views spin-offs as a means to create additional value. The significant 
shareholder gains from voluntary spin-offs reported in Table 2 are not surprising if man- 
agers maximize shareholder wealth. 
In order to gain further understanding of these results, the background of the com- 
pany, the objective of the spin-off, and the stock market's reaction to the announcement of 
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Table 2: 
Unexpected Returns during the Announcement Period, for Each Spin-Off 
Announcement and for the Portfolio of Spin-Off Announcements 
Unexpected Return on Event Day Relative to 
Announcement 
Comvanv Date Day - 1 Day 0 Day 1 
Hilton Inc. October 16,1964 0.500 4.000 - 0.600 
(0.201) (1.695) ( - 0.266) 
Holiday Corp. August 24,1989 10.500 6.900 - 2.700 
(3.921) (2.580) ( - 0.995) 
Marriott Corp. October 5,1992 12.3 - 0.700 -0.100 
(8.022) ( - 0.477) (0.055) 
Promus Cos. January 30,1995 - 1.900 5.300 3.500 
( - 0.733) (2.107) (1.397) 
Hilton Hotels May 11,1995 - 0.800 - 8.500 - 2.600 
( - 0.518) ( - 5.706) ( - 1.739) 
ITT Corp. June 13,1995 0.000 4.900 2.000 
(0.007) (4.132) (1.639) 
Host Marriott August 9,1995 1.000 3.200 - 2.200 
(0.517) (1.596) (- 1.082) 
Portfolio 3.090 2.160 - 0.390 
(4.308) (2.213) ( - 0.416) 
the spin-off is analyzed in the cases of Mamott Corporation, Promus Companies, Hilton 
Hotels, and ITT Corporation. 
Marriott Corporation 
On October 5,1992, Marriott Corporation (NYSE:MAR) announced a plan to divide 
its operation into two separate, publicly traded companies: Host Marriott (NYSE:HM'T), 
which would replace the original Mamott Company and focus solely on real estate ow- 
nership-oriented activities, and Mamott Intemational (NYSE:MAR), which would con- 
trol all of Marriott's lodging management and services operations. On October 4, the 
plan was approved by Marriott's Board of Directors and on October 8,1993, the company 
was offidally divided through a special dividend distribution of one share in the newly 
formed Marriott Intemational for each share of the original Marriott Corporation. 
Objectives 
I. Increased Profit and Growth Potential 
1 
The Journal of Hospitality Financial Management 
Prior to the spin-off, Marriott's operations included both ownership and 
management of hotels and service outlets. Mamott's services business was com- 
prised of its hotel, motel, and cafeteria management operations. This segment 
generated cash and profits with little risk and only a small amount of investment 
required. In its services division, Marriott was able to receive 3% of a hotel's 
gross revenue and a percentage of its profit. Even in recessionary times, Mar- 
riott's lodging management business could continue to grow if the company 
could expand the number of properties under its management. In contrast, the 
hotel development and ownership side of Mamott's operations were capital in- 
tensive with high associated debt levels resulting from real estate investments. 
Mamott was able to realize little of the profit potential of its services division 
due to the high interest charges associated with its ownership segment. 
2. Increased Access to Capital 
In addition, the impact of the debt associated with its massive real estate 
holdings caused Mamott to have only limited access to capital at reasonable 
rates for the purpose of expanding its more profitable management s e ~ c e s  
b~siness .~  Thus, it was believed that after the spin-off, Host Mamott would be 
able to focus upon managing its real estate holdings for long-term cash flow 
without the pressure of having to sell off assets during depressed times to sus- 
tain a healthy financial position for the company as a whole. 
3. Reduction of Asymmetric Information 
Mamott's management also believed that the combination of the company's 
real estate ownership operations and its management services businesses caused 
confusion and misperception by investors, resulting in misvaluation of the com- 
pany as a whole.* Mamott officials used the example that during recessionary 
times the company's real estate property would depredate in value, causing 
book earnings to fall, and ultimately having a negative effect on Mamott's share 
price. Mamott believed, however, that real estate holdings should be measured 
not on the basis of book earnings but rather on the basis of cash flow or other fi- 
nancial measures. 
Mamott executives (under the leadership of CFO Steve Bollenbach) came to the deci- 
sion to split the company and to create Marriott Intemational as a growth-oriented com- 
pany. It would include the company's 734 hotel and motel management contracts, its 
3,000 corporate and institutional cafeteria-management agreements, and management of 
its retirement communities, all with virtually no debt.g 
Marriott Corporation, Notice of 1993 Annual Meeting and Proxy Statement, p. 19, June 19,1993. 
* Announcement to Shareholders, Marriott Corporation Intemational Headquarters, June 
19, 1993. 
The Washington Post, "The Unseen Hand Behind Marriott's Split-Up Plan," p. F1, Oct. 12, 
1992. 
Spin-Ofls in fhe Lodging Industry 13 
Host Marriott would replace the original Mamott Corporation and would exist as a 
smaller real estate holding company and would assume almost all of the parent compa- 
ny's debt. Host Mamott would also control several cash generating assets such as food 
and beverage and merchandise concessions at airports and on toll-roads.1° In addition, 
Host Mamott was to be given access to a $600 million line of credit guaranteed by Mar- 
riott International. The announcement of the planned spin-off was officially made on Oc- 
tober 5,1992. 
Market Reaction 
Upon announcement of the split, Mamott stock dosed with a unexpected gain of 
12.3%. This abnormal return is statistically different from zero at the 1% sigruficance 
level. It has been hypothesized that this excess return represents a wealth transfer from 
bondholders to stockholders. Marriott's bondholders filed a class action suit when the 
value of the debentures decreased by 30% upon announcement that all debt would be 
assumed by Host Mamott. This decrease in value resulted from Moody's Investors Ser- 
vices downgrading Mamott's $1.4 billion in senior-level debt from Baa3 to Ba2 (junk sta- 
tus) and lowering their ratings on $400 million of other Mamott debt and preferred 
stock. Moody's stated that "prior to the announcement, Moody's grade rating was based 
on expectations that the company would continue to pay down debt as it had indicated it 
intended to do in recent financial documents.. ."I1 
Promus Companies 
On January 30,1995, the Promus Companies Incorporated (NYSE:PRI) announced a 
planned spin-off that would divide the company into two independent public corpora- 
tions: Promus Hotels (NYSE:PRH) for conducting its hotel business, and Harrah's Enter- 
tainment (NYSE:HET) for conducting its casino entertainment business. The spin-off, 
which resulted in the creation of the largest stand-alone gaming corporation in North 
~merica, '~ was officially completed on June 30,1995. 
Prior to the spin-off, the Promus Companies Incorporated had operated two large 
divisions: lodging and gaming operations. Harrah's represented Promus's casino brand, 
while the company's hotel division included Embassy Suites, Hampton Inn, and Home- 
wood Suites. Prior to Promus's decision to divide, its stock had fallen as "investors 
lo Reuters Limited, "Marriott Sees Host with Healthy Cash Flow," Oct. 22,1992. 
l1 Bondholders protested that Mamott had originally issued its debt on the basis that it 
would be backed by all of the assets of the company. Shortly after the announcement, a "steering 
committee" of major bondholders hired a Wall Street law firm to develop a lawsuit against Mar- 
riott and to assist in any settlement negotiations. Mamott withstood months of legal battles and 
negotiations with various bondholder groups, ending with a settlement to bondholders and the 
completion of the spin-off. Despite the settlement terms, Moody's and Standard & Poor's stated 
that Host Mamott would be speculative-grade. 
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soured on the gaming industry after its growth slowed in 1994."13 The company had also 
suffered from ongoing political controversy surrounding its New Orleans land-based ca- 
sino.14 By January 26 of 1995 (four days before the announcement of the spin-off), Pro- 
mus stock was trading at $31.88, down from a 52-week high of $55.25.15 
0 bjectives 
1. Reduction of Agency Costs through Management Restructuring 
The Board of Directors at Promus held the belief that the casino and hotel divi- 
sions of PRI had separate growth strategies that needed to be refined according 
to their unique market positions. They believed that each area needed the spe- 
cialized attention of a "dedicated" corporate management team. In addition, the 
Chairman of Promus, Michael D. Rose, stated that: 
by separating the companies, we will be able to more accurately focus 
accountability and rewards. The managers of each business will become 
more directly accountable to their stockholders and incentive programs 
tied to the share price of each company should help ensure a strong 
correlation between management performance and shareholder value 
creation. l6 
2. Growth Opportunities 
Promus leaders believed that although the sharing of technology, systems, and 
policies had at one time provided a synergistic foundation for the company's ho- 
tel and gaming divisions, the sharing of resources had become a constraint in the 
growth of the two entities. Each of the segments was viewed as needing strategic 
refinement with a singular focus on its own individual objectives and growth 
needs. After the spin-off, each business would be free to grow at its own rate 
with no internal competition for time, resources, or capital. Promus viewed the 
split as allowing their hotel segment to take advantage of the "surging lodging 
industry" by creating its own visibility in the market to create enhanced growth 
l2 Promus Companies News Release, "Promus Announces Plan to Split Company", Febru- 
ary 6,1995. 
l3 Casino Journal's National Gaming Summary, "Promus Splits Hotel, Gaming Entities," pp. 
1-2, Feb. 6,1995. 
l4 kid. 
l5 Ibid. 
l6 Promus Companies Incorporated News Release, "Promus Announces Plan to Split Com- 
pany" p. 2, Feb. 6,1995. 
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opportunities. Likewise, the spin-off would allow the casino company to con- 
tinue to bid on operations in new gaming jurisdictions.17 
3. Capital Market Perception & Valuation 
The Promus team believed that the Promus stock price did not accurately reflect 
the value of the company's hotels. Because the casino business was perceived as 
risky it overshadowed the profitability of the lodging division. By separating 
Promus into two companies, it was hoped that analysts, investors, and lenders 
would be better able to recognize and act upon the strengths of the individual 
businesses, particularly the hotel business whose individual strengths and pros- 
pects had been overlooked by the market? Duff and Phelps analyst Joyce Minor 
stated that "the split would unlock the value of the hotels.;. a bigbenefit to 
shareholders."19 
Market Reaction 
Analysts reacted positively to the news of the Promus divestiture. Jason Ader, Vice 
President and gaming analyst for Smith Barney, said the hotel stock should trade at a pre- 
mium compared to other issues in the field. Bruce Turner, analyst for Salomon Brothers, 
said, "the deal will prove that the sum of Promus's parts separated is greater than the 
whole. "20 
Investors also responded strongly to the announcement of the Promus split, driving 
prices up by 5.2% on the day the announcement was made, generating a positive abnor- 
mal return of 5.3%. The excess return of 5.3% is significantly different from zero at the 5% 
significance level. 
Hilton Hotels 
On May 11 of 1995, Hilton Hotels announced a planned spin-off that would create 
two separate, publicly traded companies: one controlling Hilton's gaming division 
and one for conducting the company's hotel businesses. Although the spin-off was 
17 Casino Journal's National Gaming Summary, "Promus Splits Hotel, Gaming Entities," p. 
1, Feb. 6,1995. 
'8 Promus Companies News Release, "Promus Announces Plan to Split Company," Feb. 6, 
1995. 
l9 St. Louis Post Dispatch, "Gaming Firm to Split off Hotel Business," Jan. 31,1995. 
20 Casino Journal's National Gaming Summary, "Promus Splits Hotel, Gaming Entities," pp. 
1-2, Feb. 6, 1995. , 
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contingent upon certain regulatory and other third-party approvals, Hilton scheduled 
the completed spin-off to take place in early 1996.~~ 
Objectives 
Hilton's board initiated the spin-off idea based upon the belief that the company's 
divisions would be able to develop and operate more effectively as separate companies. 
In addition, many investors and analysts felt that the spin-off would help facilitate a sale 
of Hilton (a possibility that the company had been examining). American Express Finan- 
cial Advisors expressed that the spin-off would possibly attract more potential buyers 
because of the desire to vurchase either Hilton's casino business or the hotel overations 
rather than the whole co&pany.22 For example, potential buyers seeking only hdtel assets 
would not have to deal with the gaming business and the regulatory requirements such 
as obtaining casino licenses.23 
Market Reaction 
Hilton's shares had risen from about $58 in early November 1994 due to improved 
earnings and the anticipation of a sale? Upon announcement of the spin-off, however, 
~iltonstock prices fell by 8.6%, as investors viewed it as being a statement that the com- 
pany would not, after all, sell. As shown in Table 2, news of the proposed spin-off gener- 
ated abnormal negative returns of - 8.5%. Chairman and CEO Barron Hilton remarked 
that the market might have concluded that this was the only option Hilton had decided 
- - 
to take. He stated that was not the case, and that all of Hilton's options (including a sale) 
were still open.25 This announcement is unique because there were two announcements 
from Hilton on that date. In addition to the spin-off, there was news that the company 
was unable to find a buyer for their hotel and gambling operations. The market believed 
that Hilton's decision to spin off its casinos to shareholders was the result of its failure to 
find a buyer. 
ITT 
On June 13, 1995, ITI' Corporation's (NYSE:ITT) Board of Directors approved a 
management plan to divide ITT into three separate, publicly traded corporations: ITT 
Hartford for conducting insurance services, ITT Industries Inc. for the manufacturing of 
21 Ronson, Charles, "Spin Off Report /Bloomberg Business News," June 2, 1995. 
22 Bloomberg Business News, "Hilton to Spin-Off Casino Operations; Shares Fall," p. 1, May 11, 
1995. 
23 Klein, David, Princeton Newsroom,lBloomberg Data Base, May 11,1995. 
24 Bloomberg Business News, "Hilton to Spin-Off Casino Operations; Shares Fall," p. 4, May 11, 
1995. 
25 Idem, p. 2. 
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industrial products, and the new ITT Corporation which would control ITT's hospitality, 
entertainment, and information services division. Upon completion, the transaction (in- 
volving sales and revenues of $25 billion) will be one of the largest of its kind in business 
history.26 
0 bjectives 
The Chief Executive Officer of ITT, Rand Araskog, stated that the creation of three 
companies was a "natural business progression" and that the three businesses would be 
best positioned as independent, publicly owned companies. The following objectives 
were sought by ITT leaders through the spin-off. 
I 1. Management Restructuring 
t 
ITT's CEO stated that one objective of the spin-off was to allow management to 
focus more intensively on their own businesses in order to provide each com- 
pany the flexibility to grow in a manner best suited for its industry. 
2. Capital Market Perception & Valuation 
ITT's management had long felt that Wall Street undervalued its businesses be- 
cause of the complexity of its conglomerate activiV7 Araskog stated that as a 
result of the spin-off, investors would be better able to evaluate the financial per- 
formance of each company, as well as its businesses and strategies, resulting in 
an increased access to the capital markets at a lower cost of capital.28 
Market Reaction 
Analyst Jay Cohen of Salomon Brothers viewed the transaction as "a very good 
move." He said that investors would appreciate the chance to value the companies inde- 
pendently, and added that previous spin-off deals had served to "reenergizen manage- 
ment. Other investors agreed, driving the ITT share price up by more than 5 dollars.29 
This positive reaction was reflected in returns generated on-the day of the ITT spin-off 
announcement, and was responsible for the positive abnormal return of 4.9% realized by 
ITT. 
Conclusions 
During the 1970s, spin-offs were aggressively utilized by manufacturing conglomer- 
ates. Even though there were a few spin-offs in the hospitality industry during the 1960s 
26 PR Newswire Association, PR Newswire, June 13,1995. 
27 Reuters, Limited, "Financial Report: ITT to Spin-Off Three Public," June 13,1995. 
28 PR Newswire Assodation, Inc., PR Newswire, Financial News Section. June 13,1995. 
29 The Financial Times Limited: Investors Chronicle, "US Break-Up-I'IT Does the Splits," 
June 16,1995. 
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and 1980s, it has only been since the beginning of the 1990s that this type of divestiture 
has become better recognized and utilized by the hospitality industry to enhance the 
value of shareholder investments. On average, the stock market perceived the overall 
value of the separate and distinct lines of business to be greater than the market value of 
the whole pie. The unexpected daily returns on the portfolio of announced spin-offs were 
3% and 2% on the day preceding and the day of the spin-off announcement, respectively. 
The unexpected return for the sample of lodging firms is slightly greater than that found 
using a sample representative of the overall market. For the overall market, Hite and 
Owers (1983) found the excess returns to be about 2.3% and 1.0% on the day preceding 
and the day of the spin-off announcement, respectively. 
Many companies in the lodging industry spin off segments because they feel that in- 
vestors do not properly value the parent firm due to the diverse types of operations it 
encompasses. In many situations, the parent firm and the spin-off firm have operated in 
very different lines of business and different market atmospheres. Each division has dis- 
tinct operating, financial, and investment characteristics (reflected in the volatility of 
their earnings), resulting in the two entities having different levels of risk. The spinning 
off of subsidiaries allows the resulting companies to attract capital on a basis consistent 
with their unique marketplaces. The empirical evidence presented in this paper is consis- 
tent with managers maximizing the value of the firm. This paper shows that specializa- 
tion in the lodging industry is perceived by the finanaal market to create additional 
value. In each case, the parent company spun off a division with different operating, fi- 
nancial, and investment characteristics. For example, Marriott split its property com- 
pany, Host Marriott, away from its hotel management arm, Marriott International; ITT 
Corporation completed a spin-off of Sheraton Hotels into a separate company; and Pro- 
mus Company spun out its gaming operations as a separate entity from its hotel opera- 
tions. As a result, lodging companies seeking growth and access to public financing 
should consider restructuring as a means of increasing shareholder value. 
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